[The above "Election Process" picture and the following text (except for italicized text in brackets which are my comments) are from on-line literature published by Denver Elections Division here:]
[https://www.denvergov.org/Government/Departments/Elections-Division/Election-Security]
[I see potential problems with security of mail-in election systems which may allow possibility of methods of both voter and election fraud which might be used to overturn expressed will of people via elections. In republics with democratic principles, protecting accuracy and integrity of legally valid votes is most important duty of every elections division. Election divisions work for the people, not the special interests, to help the people to achieve accurate vote tallies.]
[Conflict appears to arise between those political influences pushing for greater technocracy control and seeking to influence the outcome of elections, and American citizens wanting fair and accurate elections. Elections divisions are not to receive funds from any source other than from taxpayers as normal to their practice. Other funds to be considered bribes and both those receiving and those giving such funds to be investigated, and when found by grand jury to warrant trial, tried for high crime of election tampering.]
[Legislature's laws regarding who may and may not vote (citizenship, age, criminal status, cognitive ability, etc.) as well as all other legislative general and specific legal requirements must be upheld by election division's election processes, as well as their staff's general attitudes towards their duty and responsibility toward providing a fair and legitimate election. Where partisan or issue politics of election division staff are known, or conflict of interests renders them unable to perform their elections duties fairly, such staff shall be removed from processing of elections relevant to them.]
[Inserted herein are issues observed as needing further scrutiny, and suggested methods to eliminate potential fraudulent casting and recording of votes. Every election division should do what is best for electorate of their district, in accordance with laws and regulations passed by state legislature governing their public trust.]
[Suggested revision to laws governing elections:]
[1) Each state to maintain registry of voters received from each of the counties in their state. State to continually check for duplication of registration of voters between counties. Counties to continuously update their voter rolls. When secretary of state's office finds duplicate registrations in two or more counties, voter to be contacted and advised of violation of voting law, and voter is to ensure prompt deletion of their outdated registration in the previous county of registration. If old county does not, within one month, update deletion from their voters registration list to secretary of state's office, secretary of state to contact both counties and ensure voter looses voting rights in both counties voter registration lists.]
[2) Federal elections department to maintain registry of voters received from each of the states. Federal elections department to continually check for duplication of registration of voters between states. States to continuously update the federal elections department with their latest voter registration lists, as collected from their counties. When federal elections department finds duplication of voter registrations in two or more states, secretaries of state in which voter is registered to be notified and advised of violation of voting law. Voter is to be informed by each secretary of state wherein voter is found to be registered. After secretaries of state contact voter, that voter will promptly delete their outdated registrations. If old county does not, within one month of voter's notice from secretary of state, update deletion of registration by voter, each secretary of state to notify voter's county election division that that voter is to loose their voting rights. Registered voters with more than one simultaneous registration to lose their voter registration from all lists, and their voting rights from all voting districts. When duplications no longer exist federal elections department to notify secretary of state of voter's current residence that multiple voter registrations no longer exist and to allow voter to register in county of residence.]
[In cases of voter fraud, where voter is found to have voted in more than one precinct or otherwise acted unlawfully as a voter and leaves fingerprints, FBI to be notified to take case and prosecute violator to full extent of the law. FBI to run through all fingerprints of all states voter registration lists annually to ensure no duplications. Votes in which voter fraud is determined are not to be counted.]
[Denver's election district is used for an example only and is not my state of residence. However, Oregon, which is my state of residence (sort of, I live on a reservation held in trust by the federal government, within Oregon,) borrowed heavily from Colorado's mail-in voting system.]
[Either remove unopposed candidate positions from ballots, or make the positions easier to obtain competitive candidates.]
["Paper" envelopes to be treated paper or other material best suited to obtain fingerprints of intended voter or to find handling by others.]
[Paper ballots to be treated paper or other material best suited to obtain fingerprints of intended voter or to find handling by others. Paper ballots to have domestically (created and secured within elections division facilities) produced embedded RFID strips similar to RFID used in US bills, except each strip to contain each ballot's ID number; individual machine-readable number. Ballots without machine-readable numbers to not be included in tabulation of votes. Voter to have ballot designed to meet voter requirements set forth during that voter's registration.]
Certification of Candidates and Issues:
Any candidate or issue that is to appear on a ballot must have paperwork filed with the County Clerk and Recorder or Secretary of State, depending on the office that is being sought. This includes a petition that must be signed by a certain number of eligible voters to qualify the candidate for participation in the election. Petitions may also be circulated to place special issues on the ballot.
[Election division processing of all legislature-enacted requirements of candidates for positions and all processing of legislature-enacted requirements for initiatives to be included in ballots to be video broadcast on Secretary of State's and election divisions websites available for electorate's review, and on each county clerk's website also available for electorate's review. All proceedings to be video taped and provide real-time viewing by electorate and be recorded for electorate and candidate's and position advocates and opponents review as well.]
All submitted signatures must be verified against the Colorado voter registration database (SCORE). If enough signatures are verified to qualify the candidate or issue for an election, the petition is deemed “sufficient” and the candidate/issue is referred to the ballot.
[Note that rules governing maintenance of Colorado's voter registration database can be found here: https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/LawsRules/committeeFiles/BEAClistMaintenance.pdf Note also that Colorado says that it complies with National Voter Registration Act's list-maintenance guidelines.]
[Signatures of legal voters for position candidates and petitions for issues to be incorporated into ballots to be checked against signatures on voter registration.]
[Non-matching signatures to be authenticated via scheduled and video-taped meeting between voter and county clerk's office wherein voter brings to meeting other ID selected from list produced by elections division and approved by state legislature, filled out voter signature form, along with whatever other evidence or witnesses voter wishes to produce. Voter's fingerprints to be checked against those on record for voter registration.]
[Non-matching signatures to be authenticated via scheduled and video-taped meeting between voter and county clerk's office wherein voter brings to meeting other ID selected from list produced by elections division and approved by state legislature, filled out voter signature form, along with whatever other evidence or witnesses voter wishes to produce. Voter's fingerprints to be checked against those on record for voter registration.]
Software Programming:
Critical election information is input into various software programs. First, the specifics of the election—including offices up for election, candidates for those offices, office boundaries, and eligible electors—are programmed into the SCORE system. This system is used by all Colorado counties to maintain a single list of Colorado’s registered voters as well as to assist in administering elections.
[Each county needs to continually update their own roll of registered voters with simultaneous feedback to the voters, with input from the state and federal levels to help control voter fraud via abuse of the election system. They also need to do everything in their power to prevent election fraud via corrupt election systems.]
[Ballot initiatives need to be reviewed to contain only one clearly defined issue, with straightforward wording preventing deliberate confusion to voter's understanding of how their vote effects existing laws and what outcome of passing of initiative will mean to voters practically speaking.]
The Denver Elections Division then uploads the information contained in SCORE into software called EED (Election Event Designer), used to lay out the design of the ballot.
[Statewide COlorado voter Registration and Election (SCORE) implemented by Colorado Department of State to comply with Federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA). HAVA ought to be repealed to help reduce fraud in our election systems. If not repealed than state responses like SCORE need to be revised in how they respond to HAVA goals. Voter information of registered citizens may be better protected by states not selling US citizen information to corporations and foreign countries. SCORE falls down in: failure to maintain integrity of electoral process; failure to enable county electorate to have efficient, fair, and impartial elections; failure to provide state legislatures with an audit capability without corrupt county officials blocking their efforts; and because of the data coordination pushed by the proprietary election systems used, the resulting centralized election system produces greater and more widespread corruption. Response to HAVA, (eg SCORE) resulted in more helpful coordination of election fraud.]
[EED is product of Dominion, which is known to be proprietary software. Software code is not accessible to county clerk, state legislature nor to any elections division personnel nor contractors hired by legislature, county clerk or elections division personnel to fully review for potential of software program to allow change of election outcome via proprietary or 'blackbox' hardware or software.]
[Proprietary software that cannot be scrutinized by government and electorate must not be used. All parties interested in election's accurate recording and tabulation of votes, including voters themselves, must be able to examine equipment and software to ensure that election hardware and software cannot possibly be hacked.]
[Following is from Dominion's User Guide:
"NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND NONDISCLOSURE
"This document contains information that is protected as an unpublished work by Dominion Voting Systems (Dominion) under applicable copyright laws. The Recipient is to retain this document in confidence and is not permitted to copy, reproduce, or to incorporate the contents hereof into any other media other than as permitted in a written agreement with Dominion. The below statutory copyright notice shall not imply or be deemed publication of this product."
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/VotingSystems/DVS-DemocracySuite/documentation/EMS_EED_UserGuide.pdf]
[No proprietary software, by itself, must be involved in any election. Buy or create software which is open sourced, open to review of the software code, and the elections division must ensure - themselves or via their (legislature approved) hired or appointed experts - that the hardware and software used cannot be used surreptitiously to corrupt any election result.]
[Unwillingness of Dominion or any other software producer to allow full forensic examination of their hardware and software only intensifies distrust of electorate in Dominion (or Diebold, or any other elections hardware and software manufacturers), feeling that their reticence is possibly based upon their collusion with others in corruption of the elections.]
A file is exported from EED and imported into a ballot tallying software program called ICC, or Image Cast Central. This program is used to collect election results from each individual counting machine and produce a single cumulative tally.
[Dominion software products and others' products not capable of being directly examined by elections division, nor anyone appointed by them, nor appointed by other interested parties to the elections, shall not be hackable, especially during the election process.]
[People selected to review software and hardware for purity of processing of votes shall be subject to criminal prosecution when their failure to notify elections division of known potential for abuse of systems leads to corruption of an election.]
[How can we know for sure that ballots printed off-site when ordered by elections division using an outside service (supposed to be compatible with their scanners) might not also be surreptitiously pre-printed with candidates pre-selected, to be used to either fill ballot collecting boxes in parking lots of elections divisions on election day, or to substitute for actual votes collected from USPS, stored in private warehouses and exchanged with actual votes under cover therein.]
[Discontinue use of such products as those of Dominion machines and software in elections, unless a second open sourced system (software plus hardware)are simultaneously used during tests and elections to backcheck the accuracy of the proprietary Dominion or others' system. https://www.dominionvoting.com/imagecast-central/]
[Importing and exporting files from counting machines is scary to the electorate, and for good reason. Counting machines should not be exporting data and certainly should not be importing data. If the elections divisions continue running EED and ICC, then add to them another in-house open-sourced developed software program together with similar totally accessible and known to not contain wireless communications products, which count the votes in a more direct manner.]
[Backchecking System: List every possible permutation of potential electorates' selections based on final version of each ballot. Suppose there are 10 positions with four candidates names successfully registered for each position on the ballot. First add one fifth potential selection for all null votes or write-ins under each position. Possible permutations for such a ballot will range from 1111111111 to 5555555555. There will be a very large number of all possible permutations for every ballot face. For instance, there will be 5x5x5x5x5x5x5x5x5x5 or 5^10 = 9,765,625 permutations for example given.]
[Once voter has legally voted and votes are tabulated, voters to be given abut three weeks within which to:]
[1) Access the elections division webpage, giving their registered voter names and entering their 10-digit ballot selection number, in proper sequence, corresponding to their numbered selected alternative choices on their ballot. That 10-digit number pulls up, on the election division's website, a summary of the choices made by the voter on their cast ballot, as well as the total count of voters who selected that same permutation of candidate selections.]
[2) Also shown will be that voter's cryptographic ID which they listed on the bottom of their ballot. If present, voters are assured that their selections have been properly tabulated.]
[3) If not present, voter is to call elections division to advise of mistake in tabulation and set up meeting with elections division ombudsman personnel appropriate to adjudicate apparent errors.]
[4) Voter brings ID, phone whose number was entered on the ballot, and copy of ballot cast, or other proof of tabulation error.]
[5) Using voter's registration data ombudsman verifies ID of voter and checks to see if and when voter's ballot was received. If received too late to be counted, ombudsman informs voter that they have to be more prompt in submitting their vote in order to be received in time, and not to procrastinate next time. If voter posted their vote with USPS within reasonable time (time and date stamped by USPS) but USPS delayed returning ballot to elections division, with proper documentation of time and date ballot submitted to USPS on envelope, ombudsman will submit case for inclusion of voter's ballot to elections review board.]
[6) If voter's ballot RFID is indicated in elections division records as having been properly received on time, but still appears to have been improperly counted, cryptographic ID cross referenced in elections division relational database of votes, ombudsman will locate which permutation ballot has been tabulated in. When found, ombudsman will retrieve ballot from secure storage vault of physical ballots and will dial phone number on ballot. If voter's listed cell phone rings ombudsman will review voter's copy of the ballot and other proof and recommend to elections review board correction of any tabulation error.]
[7) If not found by cryptographic ID cross checking alone, ombudsman will cross check by ballot RFID to find which permutation stack of physical ballots voter's ballot is found. Ombudsman scans all ballots in stack to determine which ballot matches the voter's ballot RFID. Once ballot RFID is found, and neither cryptographic ID nor cell phone number matching those of the voter claiming miscount of their ballot, ombudsman will try to locate whomever cast the voter's ballot to query them to the circumstances of how they obtained and cast the wrong ballot. If not located or answers given do not sound plausible, ombudsman will turn over to DA personnel for prosecution. After review of voter's ID, ombudsman will submit recommendation to elections review board for correction of tabulation error.]
[Post the backcheck voting system's results on-line and allow electorate to review. One voter may select first alternative option on every choice given on ballot or may choose the last, and every possible choice in-between. Simply count how many ballots fall into each permutation, allocate that number to each alternative choice which is associated with that permutation, and the total numbers for each alternative for each choice determines the winners of each contested choice. Totals of permutation groups for each ballot type then provides number of votes for each candidate in every separate voting district, as well as cumulative score for statewide and nation-wide elections. Alternative locally provided backcheck software provides an accurate check of the proprietary counting machines and software's accuracy. Allow thorough examination of local software by all concerned, including the electorate.]
Ballot Design:
The content of the ballot (which races appear and the order in which they appear) is dictated by federal, state, and local laws. In the City and County of Denver, all ballots must be produced in both English and Spanish.
[To verify and ensure that proper ballots get to proper voters, embed RFID strips in ballot paper with code ID'd to specific legally registered voter. During voter registration, voter gives language preference for ballot and literature. Do not print English on ballots and literature requesting Spanish and vice versa. Also print ballots in any specific language requested during voter registration.]
Ballot design is the layout of the ballot content and is dependent upon the judgment of the local election office running the election. For enhanced clarity and simplicity, the Denver Elections Division uses best practices established at the national level by experts in ballot readability.
[Local Practice: This is local peoples' election and ought to follow their will. Rather than rely on "practices established at national level by experts," use locally established rules agreed upon with local electorate within each voting precinct for ballot design. In timely manner, post proposed layout on-line or in person during meetings run under Roberts Rules of Order. Leave out security graphics for electorate previews, but add them later. Such graphics to be used for visual inspection to quickly determine (where missing or different) validity of ballots during ballot processing. Respond to electorate critiques appropriately and re-meet with public. Print physical ballots in-house (within election division) using election division owned printing equipment for ballots.]
[Envelope Paper: Make ballot return envelopes out of materials suitable for signatures at the signature space and material covering the rest of the envelope of best suited material for retaining fingerprints. Ballot handlers other than voters handling their own ballots are to wear clean gloves to prevent leaving unnecessary fingerprints on others' ballots. Voters to give their fingerprints as part of their registration.]
[Ballot Paper: Include embedded RFID strips, like those found in paper currency, to be scanned, just prior to ballots being counted, to ensure that only legitimate ballots printed in-house at election division are included in election outcome.]
[Ballot Feedback: Based on election-division-determined number of approved alternative candidates and petition positions, from which voter of that ballot may select from; and for each different type of ballot needing to be printed, provide on-line county feedback webpage which will be made available for electorates' on-line review. Webpages to be un-hackable. Webpages to be subdivided into every possible voter choice, ballot permutation or result. Each ballot face to have separate webpage. Under or within each permutation, list cryptographic voter-placed marks in boxes on ballot.]
[Ballot Reproductions: Digitally record and store in on-site data storage device visual image of every ballot received by elections division. Arrange database of images in accordance with same set of possible ballot outcomes as noted above. Database to not be hackable and not placed on-line. Database to include how each recorded ballot was recorded or tabulated into election outcome. Database of ballot reproductions to be used to determine that voter's choices have been accurately recorded in election outcome.]
[Physical Ballot Storage: As well as on-line webpages, store physical ballots in secure fireproof facility within elections division, with ballots subdivided into every possible voter choice or ballot permutation as noted above. Physical ballots included in each grouping to be identical except for their selection markings and individually voter-filled boxes. Make physical ballots as well as envelopes available to forensic election auditors.]
[Ballot Sequencing: Number, in obvious sequence, choices for voter on ballot. For each selection made by voter, number in obvious sequence, options available. Each voter then writes list, according to ballot sequence, of numbers which corresponds to how he voted on ballot in boxes provided at bottom of ballot. Voters at home or in the voting booth can photograph or scan their vote choices together with time stamp, if needed, showing when their vote was cast and what that voters choices were at time of casting their vote.]
[Top Row of Boxes: At bottom of ballot, include 3 rows of 3/8" x 3/8" printed square boxes to optionally be hand-filled in by voter with same instrument used to mark the voter's choices in the ballot above. Box lines to be in faint color, enough to be discernable to voter but not so dark as to interfere with OCR scan of voter applied numbers and letters. Top row to have number of boxes necessary for voters to fill in their election choices - to be filled in in same sequence and with same choices marked in ballot above. If voter double marks ballot and attempts correction by erasing all but one of marks and machine kicks out ballot for adjudication because wrong marks not adequately erased, number in this box for questioned vote to be used to determine from among questioned intended selection.]
[Middle Row of Boxes: To be used for phone number, to include 16 boxes, including 3 boxes for nation code (left blank for those voting within USA), next 3 boxes for area code, plus usual seven boxes, plus 3 phone extension boxes (left blank if not used). Before elections division adjudicator selects voter's "intended" choices - where not obvious from ballot marks and filled top row of boxes, adjudicator to call voter's phone number and set up face-to-face meeting with that voter to verify voter's selections. Voter to bring to meeting any proof of their original selection.]
[Bottom Row of Boxes: 18 boxes to be marked with whatever password each voter chooses to use, to recognize the identity of their own ballot. This is the cryptographic ID to be placed in the online webpage for user to verify whether or not their own ballot has been properly tabulated. If their ballot has not been tabulated correctly the voter is to call the elections division and set up an appointment to correct the improper tabulation of their vote. Again, voter to bring whatever proof they may have to show their original ballot selections.]
Proper ballot design also involves accurate data entry and proofing of the content. This process is highly complex because it involves data entry of multiple candidates and races on a large number of ballot faces.
[Proofing of content to be done in elections division facility on elections division equipment without leaking final ballot layout to others. Do not do ballot layout design on internet-connected equipment. Keep ballot layout secure, under lock and key, with similar provisions (laws) for spying on federal top secret documents.]
Because there are 346 precincts in the City and County of Denver, there are 346 different ballot faces for a general election. For primary elections, each party has a different ballot face in each precinct. Thus, any precinct may have up to four ballot faces and the county as whole may have as many as 1,029 ballot faces. Each of these ballot faces must be accurately proofed before ballot production can begin.
In addition to the design of paper ballots, electronic ballots must also be designed, produced, and proofed to be used on electronic voting machines. Electronic voting machines also contain audio ballots that must be recorded onto the machines.
[In lieu of using electronic voting machines to output paper ballots for scanners to read, use paper ballots marked by voters directly. Where voter is blind or cannot otherwise accurately mark their own ballot, their vote to be dictated to elections division ombudsman with someone known to and approved by voter present to witness or corroborate that voter's ballot is marked correctly.]
[Unless these proprietary machines can be totally investigated, able to be broken down into individual components to determine total functioning and function of each piece, do not use them. Swap them for voting machines which elections division hired investigators, approved by legislature, have found to be incapable of being manipulated by anyone other than legal voters in casting of their votes, and are also totally open to complete investigation by county elections division personnel and election auditors. If proprietary software continues to be used, provide an open-source backcheck system to be run simultaneously with the proprietary software and hardware. This backcheck software will provide quick verification of accuracy of proprietary software. Alternatively, backcheck equipment may be analog rather than digital, as long as it records number of ballots cast for each permutation.]
Equipment Testing:
Prior to and after every election, the equipment used to record, tabulate, and report votes must be tested according to state laws and regulations.
[Again, Dominion's (previously Diebold) tests are inadequate, by themselves, to ensure accuracy of actual election results. Provide open sourced elections division software in separate feed of physical ballots to backcheck any proprietary software and machines used in elections. Do not re-feed ballots to falsely increase count. Such practices are election tampering and shall result in stiff fines and imprisonment.]
The Hardware Diagnostic test is performed to verify that mechanical components of each electronic voting device are working correctly. After the successful completion of the test for each device, the devices are sealed. Documentation of the sealed information and all testing records for each device are maintained by the Denver Elections Division.
[Testing of Dominion machines may be designed to satisfy county elections division of accuracy during pre-election test, yet then allow election day actual results to be remotely or inherently revised, or skewed. Unless the software and equipment used is fully investigated by any and all people interested in fairness and accuracy of elections, they are not to be used without open-source backcheck systems. Provide elections division open-sourced software and open equipment used in separate simultaneous run to backcheck the validity of the proprietary equipment's results. Test not only the proprietary system, but also the open-source system.]
The Logic and Accuracy Test is a documented review of the Elections Division’s ability to produce accurate results of voter choices. It is performed by staff and an appointed testing board consisting of at least one representative from each major political party, and it is open to the public and media.
[Again, Dominion's (previously Diebold) tests are inadequate, by themselves, to ensure accuracy of actual election results. Provide separate open-source system of software and hardware known to not be accessible to outside manipulation, through which all ballots are to be run to verify the accurate counting of the proprietary system.]
For this test, staff prepare a test deck of ballots that includes every ballot style and a voted position for every candidate on every race, including write-in candidates, overvotes, and undervotes. This deck is run through high speed ballot scanners, and results are compared to a hand tally. The test board signs a Public Logic and Accuracy Testing Certification document verifying that all required testing was completed in a satisfactory manner.
[Again, Dominion's tests are inadequate to ensure accuracy of actual election results. Run test deck through back-check open source system as well. Test both proprietary and open source back-check systems simultaneously. Test results of both systems must match the hand count.]
After Election Day, a post-election audit takes place when the Secretary of State randomly selects which election machinery is to be audited. The machinery selected includes five percent of the ballot marking devices and at least one of the high speed ballot scanners. A report is generated, and the ballots are hand-tallied and compared to the report.
[Again, Dominion's tests are inadequate to ensure accuracy of actual election results. All election machines (ballot marking and scanning) and software must be thoroughly examined and tested before and after the election. Back-check open-source system to verify accuracy of proprietary system in sample ballots selected. Election results not final until two systems totals and hand counts of samples all match. Discrepancies in proprietary systems counts assumed to be corrupted by outside influencers until proven otherwise.]
Ballot Production:
Production includes both the printing of ballots and the insertion of those ballots into mail ballot packets. Ballots are printed using strict requirements from the Elections Division, such as proper paper weight and registration of the ballot image on the paper. With such strict requirements, only certain certified printers are able to produce ballots in Denver.
[Ensure that all printing is done in-house with appropriate paper and safety precautions observed as before. Ensure that the RFID chips embedded in all ballots are readable prior to mailing out of ballots. Failure of election division personnel to obey regulations and those caught conspiring to promote printing of illegal ballots to be severely punished to the extent of the law.]
Once printed, ballots are inserted into a generic ballot packet, then the individual voter’s name and barcode are imprinted onto the outside envelope. This process is complex and requires precise use of computer generated databases and insertion machinery, as every voter must be sent a ballot that corresponds to their correct precinct and ballot face.
[Delete barcode from outside envelope of ballots sent to those voters who request that their barcode be omitted. Provide complete mailing (physical) address of each registered voter on outside envelope. Those seeking to corrupt the accuracy of vote, will use whatever information they might obtain to verify number of voters in each precinct. Hacking or otherwise having access to computer records helps cheaters to coordinate their election theft with others. Also possible for voter returned envelopes to be intercepted and barcode scanned prior to being returned to elections division from USPS. Those envelopes whose barcode go with GOP or democrat voters may be discarded or even replaced prior to being returned to elections division. Reduce certainty of those attempting to perpetrate election fraud.]
Ballot TRACE:
The Denver Elections Division's BallotTRACE (Ballot Tracking, Reporting, and Communications Engine) allows Denver voters to track mail ballots from the printer to the mail facility and back to the elections office. Voters can choose to receive notifications by email or text message about the status of their ballot.
[Delete barcode from outside envelope of ballots sent those voters who request that barcode be omitted. Provide complete mailing (physical) address of each registered voter on outside envelope. Elections division personnel responsible for directing ballots without barcodes to proper voting tabulation machines. Legal voters responsible for verifying, on-line, that their names and addresses are properly logged by county clerk to receive ballot in upcoming election. Failure of voter to verify their registration is current and correct results in their restriction from voting in election unless it is corrected at least one month prior to election. Provide continuous time-stamped online real time video of ballot mail deliveries between elections office and any other facility to be available to voters and auditors review. Record transport of mail for later review by election auditors.]
Ballot Delivery to USPS:
Denver Elections sends ballots to voters through the United States Postal Service. Ballots are sent between 22 and 18 days before Election Day and are automatically sent to all voters designated by Colorado election law as "active" voters.
[Verify accuracy of elections division's list of "active" voters just prior to printing out ballots. People handling ballots (other than voters handling only their own personal ballot) must wear gloves and have large legible numbers cross referenced to their identities on special colored vests designating them as ballot handlers. Also, people handling ballots (other than voters) must not handle nor be allowed access to any marking pens, similar to any kind of instrument which might be used by electorate to mark their ballots.]
[Ballot handling to be fully video recorded and posted on-line real time on elections division's clearly designated website for voters' review. People caught handling ballots without proper gloves and vests subject to arrest, with large personal fines and stiff jail-sentences.]
[Increase number of days before election day that ballots are turned over to voters to allow proper resolution of missing ballots or other problems.]
Once printed, ballots are packaged in trays and on pallets. These packages are then weighed by USPS representatives on location at the printer. The ballots are then transferred in secured trucks to the General Mail Facility in Denver. Once the ballot shipment arrives, the postal inspector and representatives from the Denver Elections Division are present to inspect the shipment to ensure the correct quantity. The mail ballots are scanned into the post office's mail tracking system and sorted into routes for delivery to Denver voters.
[Print ballots and envelopes at elections division facilities on in-house elections division equipment. Scan into USPS mail tracking system only those ballots on which barcodes are included. USPS personnel responsible for determining that unmarked ballots and other mail are promptly delivered.]
Ballot Delivery to Voters:
Ballots are delivered to voters via USPS carriers. Voters are encouraged to visit GoVoteColorado.gov to make sure their address is current. The deadline to make changes to a voter record and have a ballot delivered by mail is eight days before Election Day. After that, a voter may visit any Voter Service and Polling Center to vote in person or obtain a mail ballot.
[During process of verifying list of "active" voters, elections division verifies voters' associated addresses are correct. Mail carriers to wear gloves and ballot handling vests while delivering ballots to voters. Obtain signature of voter for receipt of ballot. Delivered ballots to be recorded online for voters to review and assure that they have received their ballot. Undelivered ballots recorded as being delivered, after voter ascertains that original ballot has been delivered to wrong voter, results in replacement ballot being provided.]
[Embedded RFID chip of mis-delivered ballot will be recorded as invalid and will not be allowed to be counted during election. RFID scanning to find and eject duplicate cast ballot into pile to be scanned for fingerprints and referral to FBI for potential criminal prosecution. Anyone interfering with ballot handler's delivery of ballots to voters is to receive additional penalties to those incurred due to regular interference with mail carriers duties. Mail carriers not properly carrying out their deliveries subject to additional penalties.]
Return of Ballots to Elections Division:
Voted ballots may be returned through USPS or any other delivery service a voter might choose. To return a voted ballot by mail, the voter should affix the correct amount of postage. However, the Denver Elections Division will not refuse ballots that do not have the proper postage affixed. Once the post office receives a voted ballot, it is scanned into the USPS mail tracking system and delivered in bulk to the Denver Elections Division on a daily basis.
[Unless voter returns ballot in person, voter shall affix proper postage to USPS or other delivery service, otherwise elections division should not accept returned mailed ballot, except where required to do so by the state legislature. Ballots delivered in person to be promptly date and time stamped by elections division. Batches of mail returned by USPS to elections division to be real-time videoed for surveillance by electorate.]
Alternatively, a voter may return a ballot by dropping it off in person or having another person deliver it for them to any ballot drop-off location or Voter Service and Polling Center (VSPC). The Denver Elections Division has 37 24-hour ballot drop-off boxes available throughout the city. Drive-up ballot drop-offs are also provided outside all VSPCs. Colorado law restricts any one person from dropping off more than 10 ballots in an election. Voting site locations can be found by visiting DenverVotes.org.
[Drive-by drop off boxes at all locations to have at least 3 recording security cameras motion activated and posting video on-line to elections division website to catch voters depositing votes. Cameras aimed at openings into drop boxes, driver's face, handled mail, and license plate of vehicle at drive-up ballot deposit boxes.]
[Interference with cameras and stuffing of ballots to entail heavy fines and long imprisonment. Fingerprints taken from ballots not consistent with intended voter's fingerprints will not be included in vote tally. Voters and others returning voted ballots are not to wear gloves when handling and depositing ballots in ballot collection boxes. Drop off boxes to have weight scales to detect when more than 10 envelopes are deposited within 10 seconds. Such envelopes to be deposited in separate box and kept separate until voters' and depositor's fingerprints are checked. If voter fraud suspected, begin case. Keep evidence separated until guilt or innocence of depositors and voters are determined.]
All voted ballots must be in the possession of the Denver Elections Division by 7 p.m. on Election Day in order to be counted.
[In-person vote submittals must be speedily processed by elections division. Remote ballot collection boxes to either have accurate clocks and mechanisms designed to prevent ballots from being deposited after date and time legally established by state legislatures, or elections division staff to man machines at the stated cutoff time and take only those envelopes deposited within date and time stated by the legislature. Provide known ballot collection box at county clerk's office, county facility parking lots, in every precinct and centrally located within every cluster of 25 city blocks or 1,000 voters.]
[Ballots in envelopes not received by due date and time to be disposed of and voter notified of their failure to submit vote in timely manner.]
Voter Services & Polling Service:
Voter Service and Polling Centers (VSPCs) are opened 8-15 days prior to Election Day depending on the type of election. Services include:
* Replacement ballots
* In-person paper and in-person accessible machine voting
* Ability to make an address change
* Ability to register to vote
* Return a voted mail ballot
[Increase VSPC days and hours before election day to respond to increased requirements to reduce and undo election irregularities. In person and accessible machine voters who were previously recorded as having received ballots are to bring their original ballots with them. If voters are not to be required to maintain their voter record accuracy, then provision of making address change and register to vote shall comply with laws of authority having jurisdiction over voting district.]
[RFID of replacement ballots to be recorded and original ballot's RFID chip to be blocked from being counted in the election. Ballots without RFID not to be counted. Voted mail ballots ought to be returned directly to county clerk's office to reduce potential of mishandling of ballots by VSPCs.]
[Again handlers of ballots by other than the voter of that ballot need to wear the ballot handler vests with IDs and be viewed on line real time and recorded during the time that they handle other peoples' ballots. Again, handlers of ballots by other than voters are not to have marking devices in their hands nor be allowed access to them. If voters return their ballots to ballet collection boxes inside VSPC offices they need to be videoed as for those using drive-up ballot collection boxes.]
Ballot Receiving:
All activities in ballot processing rooms can be witnessed by the public. For security, all rooms are card-keyed and video-monitored 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Every election worker in ballot processing rooms must wear a coordinating vest, identification badge, and party affiliation button.
[Security camera output to be broadcast real time via elections division website online, fully accessible to all of electorate to watch. Video is to be recorded on durable media and stored for later review by election forensic auditors.]
Mail ballots are delivered to the Denver Elections Division by USPS and by Elections Division staff from drop boxes located throughout the City.
In this room, ballot boxes and mail trays are weighed and logged into the Elections Division’s ballot tracking system to record where and when voters have delivered their ballots. Ballots are then transferred by a ballot security team to the Signature Verification Room. Out-of-county ballots are time-stamped and sent back to the appropriate county.
[USPS and election division staff delivering returned ballots to wear gloves and special colored vests with large number IDs on vest indicating staff members ID on video broadcast of their delivery procedure over entire trip from ballot boxes to secure locked storage vault into which ballots are delivered in elections division facility. All ballots to be under constant supervision by the electorate.]
[Record and video report on-line of collecting and transporting, signature verification, and all handling of ballots within elections division facility. After time-stamping, report to other counties mis-delivered ballots noting their time stamping and return them to the USPS or await the other county's staff to retrieve them, as requested by the other county's election division staff. Continue to handle mis-delivered ballots in same manner as for handling appropriate county ballots.]
Ballot Verification:
Workers in this room are trained by a Certified Document Examiner. Ballots are run through the Bell and Howell Elevate Criterion machine, which date- and time-stamps the ballot, removes the secrecy tab, compares the barcode on the envelope to data from the voter registration database, and captures the signature image of all eligible voter signatures. Signatures are reviewed by bipartisan election judges.
[Handling of physical ballot envelopes (other than voters handling their own ballot envelope,) by staff of elections division and USPS staff and election judges to be supervised by not only partisan overseers but also by electorate via 24/7 online real-time video which is also to be fully recorded. Physical ballot envelope handling to be done with gloved hands and handlers to wear special vests with legible ID. Incidents of apparent malfeasance or work not in keeping with the public's trust to be reported by electorate via on-line feedback to county board of commissioners, sheriff's department, district attorney, legislature, political parties, public media, as well as any other individuals and groups interested in fair and accurate elections, as a form of election-related 911.]
[Certified Document Examiner to be approved by state legislature prior to appointment by elections division.]
[Bell and Howell's Elevate Criterion machine must be able to be fully understood, repaired and verified by election division personnel, legislature-appointed experts and election auditors. Data derived from these machines must not be allowed to be real-time or otherwise shared with anyone outside of elections division.]
[Otherwise, provide alternative machines which are not only capable of performing same function but are also able to be fully reviewed by legislature-appointed experts and determined by them that these machines' data cannot be falsely manipulated by anyone outside of those authorized to mend non-functioning machines.]
[Date and time stamp locations printed by machine on non-mailed ballot envelopes not to interfere with legibility of marked ballots. Removal of "secrecy tabs"(?) not to mar ballots. Where barcode omitted on outer envelope, compare return address and RFID strip of ballot to voter's registration database which is to include RFID strip number of delivered ballot. In addition to signature scan, outer envelope and ballot to be scanned for voter fingerprints which are also to be compared to those included in voter's registration database.]
[In lieu of "bipartisan team" of signature judges, provide a multi-party team consisting of two democrats, two republicans, and three "independents" who are registered to non-democrat non-GOP parties, such as: libertarian party, socialist party, constitution party, green party, American independent party, communist party, tea party, working families party, no party affiliation, etc. No two or three of these three independent party members of the multi-party team of signature judges are to come from the same independent party, unless classed as "no-party affiliation" in their voter registration.]
[During voter registration voter shall indicate interest in their personal involvement whenever there are any questions regarding authenticity of their ballot. People who may wish to corrupt vote tabulation may wish to know who has and who has not returned their ballots in order to provide fake ballots "for" those who have not returned their ballots. Where barcode has been omitted by request of voter, questions as to authenticity of their ballot shall be addressed directly to voters themselves when so chosen by voter during registration. Schedule face to face meeting with elections division ombudsman and voter to verify signature.]
If the signature matches, the ballot is accepted and the voter’s record is updated to show that a ballot was verified. If the signature does not match, a bipartisan team of two compares signatures. Accepted ballots are sent to the Ballot Preparation Room. Voters with rejected ballots due to non-matching or missing signatures are sent a Signature Affidavit Form and must also submit a copy of acceptable identification.
[Handling of physical ballots (other than voters handling their own ballot,) by teams to be surveilled by electorate via 24/7 online real-time video on elections division website, which is also fully recorded. Physical ballot handling to be done with gloved hands and handlers to wear special vests with legible ID. Envelope and ballot handling staff are not to have in their possession and form of marking instrument of any kind which the electorate might use to mark their ballots. Incidents of apparent malfeasance or work not in keeping with the public's trust to be reported by electorate via on-line feedback to county board of commissioners, sheriff's department, district attorney, legislature, political parties, public media, as well as any other individuals and groups interested in fair and accurate elections.]
[Replace "bipartisan team of two" with "multiparty team of seven".]
[Ballots of voters with rejected signatures (missing or non-matching) sent Signature Affidavit Form shall meet face to face with elections division ombudsman at appointed time in a video recorded and real-time online broadcast meeting available for electorate viewing. Electorate knowing voter may present evidence online for signature team and ombudsman's review.]
[Copy of acceptable ID turned over to ombudsman and explanation for missing or non-matching signatures explained by voter. If signature of voter is impracticable due to known circumstances and signature made by someone else known to voter is acceptable, it shall be stated and approved during voter registration or re-registration and actual signer is also to be present during meeting with ombudsman.]
[If voter is incapable of coming to meeting, then ombudsman will schedule meeting to take place at voter's location together with online video providers and signer if applicable. Cogency of such voters, ability to recall voting and choices at time of vote will be determined by ombudsman and reported to signature verification team.]
[In conjunction with signature verification, check ballots to ensure that RFID of ballot coincides with voter to whom ballot was to be delivered. Duplicate submitted ballots shall be checked to verify authenticity with ombudsman and registered voter.]
[When signature is accepted, verification of accepted signature shall be posted on elections division website for registered voters to see that a ballot in their name has been received by elections division.]
[Verified voters who appear to have submitted two ballots will have ballots pulled from processing until correct one is determined. Unlawful casting of duplicate ballots to be prosecuted to full extent of the law. Fingerprints of voter taken during registration compared with those found on envelopes.]
Ballot Preparation:
Ballots from the Signature Verification Room are delivered to the Ballot Preparation Room by a bipartisan ballot security team. In this room, batches of ballots are logged into the Elections Division’s ballot tracking system. Ballots are removed from envelopes with a high speed envelope opener/extractor, then a bipartisan team works together to remove any stray tabs left on the ballot, flatten out the folds in the ballot, and place the ballots in a ballot transfer case.
[Wherever "bipartisan" is written, substitute "multiparty".]
[High speed envelope opener/extractor not to mar ballot. Flattening of ballots to be accomplished by foot-operated press which has fabric covered platens which also removes static and any surface moisture from ballots. Reduce staff and others handling of ballots to minimum. Staff to handle ballots on the edges while wearing clean gloves.]
[Multiple video cameras broadcasting online real-time 24/7 and continuously recording all activities, and lack of activities, in all ballot processing and handling rooms and spaces fully available to electorate to view. All handling of ballots by staff of elections division and USPS personnel to be done wearing clean gloves and wearing special colored elections division vests with ID of persons handling ballots clearly legible and cross-referenced for online identification.]
[All activities of ballot handlers to be discernable to online electorate watchers, just as casino employees are taught to be clear in their handling of cards and money to view of security cameras, so too are elections division and other handlers of ballots to be taught for online viewing by electorate. Any questionable behaviors detected by electorate to be immediately reported on the website which is also to be monitored by county sheriff and others who will send deputies and representatives to election division to examine election process, deter crime, arrest those abusing the public trust, and take custody of evidence where and as appropriate.]
[Failure of sheriff deputies to act appropriately to questionable activities of ballot processing staff to entail referral of possible criminal activities to state police, DAs & legislative representatives. Election auditors to be advised of date and time of potential election fraud reported online by viewing electorate.]
Ballot Counting:
Ballots from the Ballot Preparation Room are delivered to the Ballot Counting Room by a ballot security team. In this room, election judges receive ballot transfer cases and log them into the Elections Division’s ballot tracking system. A unique number is imprinted onto every ballot card to determine the number of ballots in each batch, then an election judge processes ballots through high speed scanners.
[Activities having to do with handling of ballots to be done using gloves. Activities having to do with handling or processing of ballots to be done under video surveillance by electorate via online cameras and displayed on election division's website. While handling or processing ballots election division staff and others to have large legible ID readable by electorate online. Criminal penalties to be imposed against anyone involved with handling and processing of ballots without simultaneous surveillance by electorate. Eliminate imprinted number on ballots by using RFID strip number embedded within each ballot. Sealed ballot transfer cases to be marked with large ID recognizable to electorate when transporting them. Cross views of cameras to ensure continuous viewing of ballots being transferred between rooms.]
The scanners read the marks on the ballots that indicate a voter’s choice for candidates and issues, then pass the results to a tabulation computer. Ballots that are successfully scanned are sealed in a ballot transfer case, logged into the ballot tracking system, and are sent to the Ballot Storage Room where they will remain for 25 months before being destroyed.
[Video surveillance, gloves and special vests worn by ballot handlers including ballot security teams and election judges in ballot preparation, ballot counting and ballot storage rooms. In lieu of imprinting unique number on ballot cards, utilize embedded RFID strips in ballot paper and record to determine number of ballots in each batch.]
[In addition to processing through proprietary high speed scanners, also process through election division scanners determined by all interested parties to be free from influence by outside input, other than voter's ballots. Back-checking counting machines use open-source software. Back-checking ballot counting machines pass on count of voter ballots to appropriate permutation group in tables in elections division website, together with OCR read cryptographic IDs for voter feedback.]
[Ballots from backcheck machines to be automatically (to extent practicable) redistributed into appropriate permutation groups, where all voter selections of ballots in each group are marked the same. Where outside of the 50 most commonly marked ballots, gloved staff will separate into appropriate groups. These common groups will then be sealed inside marked ballot transfer cases then to be stored in the secure storage room.]
Ballot Duplication:
In the rare instance that a scanner cannot read a damaged ballot, a bipartisan ballot resolution team examines the ballot and sends it to the ballot duplication team, who examines the damaged ballot to determine voter intent, then correctly makes a duplicate by marking a blank ballot. The teams keep a journal with important information about each ballot that is duplicated. All original and duplicated ballots are numbered the same so that they can be identified at a later time if necessary. Duplicated ballots are returned to the Ballot Counting Room. The damaged ballots are sealed in a ballot transfer case and sent to the Ballot Storage Room.
[Ballot resolution and ballot duplication teams to wear gloves and ID vests and be conspicuously videoed online to show to electorate real time their every move. Repeal use of all such ballot duplications to extent practicable. Ballot resolution as well as ballot duplication team to not only be bipartisan, but to incorporate all parties and individuals involved and interested in the election to extent practicable. American elections are not limited to the two main parties but must equally respect all individuals interested in the results of the election.]
[Ballot duplication is open to such temptation to defraud that it must never be allowed to occur unless ballot is so damaged that voter's intent is not discernable. Do not make duplicate ballots without prior face-to-face contact between voter of questioned ballot, ombudsman, ballot resolution and ballot duplication teams to obtain voter's written approval of resulting duplicate ballot before returning it to ballot counting room to be rescanned by both proprietary and back-check vote scanners. Rejected ballot to be destroyed, and records of old RFID numbers to be changed to show that they have been deleted and what replacement ballot RFID number is recorded as used by voter. Only verified voter of ballot may touch ballot with ungloved hands.]
If a ballot has improper marks, over/under votes, or the voter intent is not clear, then the ballot is sent electronically to an adjudication team, a bipartisan team of two election judges that review the ballot and determine voter intent based on a Voter Intent Guide provided by the Secretary of State. The team marks the ballot digitally and a log of their decisions is attached to the ballot.
[Wherever physical ballots are involved, everyone who is not the original intended voter of that ballot shall wear gloves when handling ballots.]
[In lieu of "bipartisan team" of election judges, provide multi-party team consisting of two democrats, two republicans, and three "independents" who are registered to non-democrat non-GOP parties, such as: libertarian party, socialist party, constitution party, green party, American independent party, communist party, tea party, working families party, no party affiliation, etc. No two or three of these three independent party members of the multi-party team of election judges are to come from the same independent party, unless classed as "no-party affiliation" in their voter registration.]
[To extent practicable, do not send ballots to multi-party adjudication teams until after physical ballots have been scanned by backcheck system which may resolve questions of voter's ballot choice. Reports of unusually large numbers of rejected ballots due to proprietary equipment settings being purposely set to reject high numbers of cast ballots, in order for unchecked partisan adjudication to change voter's intent must not be allowed to occur.]
[If proprietary system scanner rejects ballot due to inability to read voter's intent, stack such ballots beside the backcheck system hardware and run them separately through the backcheck system. If backcheck system is capable of correctly selecting appropriate permutation group per it's hardware and software where proprietary system could not, then avoid any further elections division or adjudication team involvement with interpretation of physical or digital imaged ballots. Simply report outcome of ballots rejected by proprietary system as corrected by the backcheck system, so adjudication team may correct the proprietary system's count to match that of backcheck system.]
[Backcheck system scanner will not only read and record ballot marks above, but also will OCR top row of boxes on ballot to read voter's intended choice between ballot alternatives provided for given ballot position or initiative choice.]
[Where ballot choice is left unselected or unread, the backcheck system will default to the null vote choice. Adjudication teams are not to fill in blanks left by voter and recount ballots.]
[Where ballot choice is marked for two or more competing alternatives and erasure not complete enough to prevent incorrect alternates to be read simultaneously with voter's intended alternative selection, then OCR for that position choice is read and overrides the mistaken duplicate reading. (Pro-Mayor Daly election workers in Chicago used to double mark ballots of voters whose votes they wanted to have thrown out.)]
[Where ballot alternative selections are double marked and the top row of boxes are blank or marked over, then send ballot to adjudication team who will contact voter and via face to face meeting provide correct duplicate ballot with voter's written approval, as described above.]
Ballot Tabulation:
Ballot tabulation takes place on a tabulation computer located in the Ballot Counting Room. Tabulation is accomplished by collecting scanned vote results from high speed ballot scanners and paper ballots from ballot marking devices. The results are sent to the ballot tabulation computer through an isolated secure network that has no ties to any other network or the internet.
[Electorate distrusts Dominion and any other proprietary system equipment. Voters believe proprietary systems might have secret pieces of equipment inside allowing ties to other networks or the internet, or internal processes by which the voters' will and count (one person one vote) might be changed, or corrupted. Proprietary systems ought not be allowed to be used at all. But if they are to be used, then validity of their tabulated votes needs to be back checked with system known not to allow for such outside manipulation.]
[Machines whose every part has been inspected, diagnosed by legislature-appointed experts and verified not to contain any source within them which allows the elections equipment to output nor input data regarding the vote count other than manually by elections division staff under 24/7 online supervision of the electorate and subject to arrest, fines and imprisonment when caught manipulating the valid count results from the election. Election machines are to be 100 percent accurate. Such machines to be analog, or if digital, to use open-source software available to be reviewed by elections division staff, appointed experts, the electorate and election audit teams. Software also to be 100 percent accurate.]
[Once scanned by proprietary scanners, ballots then to be immediately scanned by election division's open-source back check scanners.]
The computer collects and compiles all results using Results Tally Reporting (RTR). From this system, results are printed and downloaded to an external drive so that they can be uploaded to the Elections Division’s website.
[Again, RTR is a Dominion product. If elections division allows proprietary systems for their elections, then for the sake of the electorate provide an open-source backcheck system.]
Publication of Unofficial Results:
On Election Night, unofficial election results are posted at the Elections Division and on its website (www.denvervotes.org), beginning at 7 p.m. and are updated every 1.5 hours until counting is completed. These unofficial results are also provided to media organizations.
[Unofficial election result updates posted to elections division website to be supplemented with backcheck system electorate review. Backcheck system to display, on elections division website, top 49 permutations of most popular voters' choices of ballot selections, plus one catch-all category of remaining ballot selections made by electorate.]
[Backcheck display to follow sequence of voters' ballot ID numbers for each ballot type and precinct.]
[Voters to go online and type into search box, provided on elections division website, same sequence of alternative selections which they made on their ballot. Online voter to be immediately directed to that ballot permutation. Website to continually update number of ballots received for each permutation for backcheck system. Along with display of number of ballots received matching that permutation, updates to display, via OCR, cryptographic IDs which voters placed in bottom row of boxes on their ballots.]
[If voter does not find their ballot tabulated in accordance with how they voted, they may seek, via their ballot ID number, in which ballot selection permutation their ballot has been placed by the elections division. When discovered that their ballot has been recorded in the wrong permutation, they may make an appointment with the elections division's voter ombudsman, to correct the permutation into which their ballot is to be placed.]
[In addition to their own ballot permutation and using cross-checking to ensure that voters ballot was properly counted (by finding their personal cryptographic ID there,) elections division website will also include spreadsheet, for voter review, of numbers of each permutation and continually updated subtotal for each candidate for each position as well as each initiative, based on numbers of ballots recorded for each ballot permutation returned.]
[Vote tabulations of proprietary systems not to be certified until they match tabulation of votes of backcheck system, unless otherwise directed by state legislature following findings of forensic audit of election in question.]
[Where proprietary system vote tabulations have been certified, but later findings of forensic audit of election in question determine that proprietary system vote tabulations do not accurately match the will of the people via either significant voter fraud, election fraud, or both, that election outcome will be vacated and a re-election will be made, using the above backcheck system to verify the proprietary system, with forensic audit also available to all interested parties.]
Post Election Activities:
After Election Day, various post-election activities occur prior to the official canvass of election and certification of results. These include: processing provisional ballots, reconciling forms used at Voter Service and Polling Centers, sending and receiving signature discrepancy letters, sending and receiving identification letters, assisting voters who come into the office to sign their ballots, and processing ballots received within eight days of the election from overseas electors.
[Also include proper resolution of voter-ombudsman claims of miscounted votes.]
Risk-limiting audit
A risk-limiting audit uses statistical analysis to allow election officials to review a few of all ballots cast in an election to double-check outcomes. Risk-limiting audits are required for all Colorado elections. These audits use a random number seed and a computer algorithm to select random ballots to check against tabulation software results. This ensures strong statistical confidence in election outcomes.
[In addition to risk-limiting audits, full forensic audits are required to verify accurate election results at direction of any of interested parties, including voters, competing politicians, political parties and other states where election results impact them legally or fiscally.]
Canvass of election and certification of results
The canvass of an election is the process by which the unofficial results are thoroughly examined and certified. The canvass is conducted by the Denver Canvass Board, which consists of one or more appointees from the two major political parties and the Denver Clerk and Recorder or designee. The Canvass Board reconciles the ballots cast in an election to confirm that the number of ballots counted in that election does not exceed the number of ballots cast in that election. The board also reconciles the ballots cast in each precinct to confirm that the number of ballots cast does not exceed the number of registered electors in the precinct.
[Board of canvassers to include not just the two political parties, but all other interested parties and independents as well. Canvas board to allow all parties and voters to ensure that their votes were properly tabulated, to ensure that no voter fraud nor election fraud took place. Where canvas board and interested parties observe differences, forensic audits to take place under strictest and most transparent conditions to logically satisfy all parties and voters thast one person - one vote occured. Where impasse remains, revote the election under tighter security and more open transparency. Everyone, including elections division personnel, sheriff and police department personnel, voting equipment manufacturers and support staff, voters, party staff, politicians, canvas boards, et al, subject to heavy fines and stiff prison sentences where found to contribute to voter fraud, election fraud, or both.]
The Canvass Board inspects documents that have been produced by the Elections Division and presented to the board during a meeting conducted approximately two weeks after the election. However, the Canvass Board can examine any election documents it desires and may be present to inspect any pre- or post-election activities.
[Change the "two weeks" to something longer, to allow resolution of all voter-observed discrepancies and re-tabulations of results.]
No later than the thirteenth day after a primary election or the seventeenth day after any other election, the Canvass Board certifies the abstract of votes cast and transmits the certification of election results to the Secretary of State, the City and County of Denver, and any other political subdivisions involved in the election.
[Change "thirteenth day" and "seventeenth day" to something longer, to allow resolution of all voter-observed ombudsman agreed discrepancies to be corrected and re-tabulations of results made. Also, revise dates by which discrepancies found in elections results may be filed in court, so that a more reasonable length of time is allowed for such filings. Standing to include vying candidates, voters, states, counties, et al., but not the English royalty.]
[These are only my thoughts and observations on ways and means to ensure accurate election results. Anything that can be adopted to help the electors see that the voting and tabulations are accurate will be appreciated.]